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Heartfelt empathy? No association
between interoceptive awareness,
questionnaire measures of empathy,
reading the mind in the eyes task or
the director task
Vivien Ainley*, Lara Maister and Manos Tsakiris
Lab of Action and Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, UK
Interoception, defined as afferent information arising from within the body, is the basis of
all emotional experience and underpins the ‘self.’ However, people vary in the extent to
which interoceptive signals reach awareness. This trait modulates both their experience
of emotion and their ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ in multisensory contexts.
The experience of emotion and the degree of self/other distinction or overlap are
similarly fundamental to empathy, which is an umbrella term comprising affect sharing,
empathic concern and perspective-taking (PT). A link has therefore often been assumed
between interoceptive awareness (IA) and empathy despite a lack of clear evidence.
To test the hypothesis that individual differences in both traits should correlate, we
measured IA in four experiments, using a well-validated heartbeat perception task, and
compared this with scores on several tests that relate to various aspects of empathy.
We firstly measured scores on the Index of Interpersonal Reactivity and secondly on the
Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy. Thirdly, because the ‘simulationist’
account assumes that affect sharing is involved in recognizing emotion, we employed
the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task’ for the recognition of facial expressions.
Contrary to expectation, we found no significant relationships between IA and any
aspect of these measures. This striking lack of direct links has important consequences
for hypotheses about the extent to which empathy is necessarily embodied. Finally, to
assess cognitive PT ability, which specifically requires self/other distinction, we used
the ‘Director Task’ but found no relationship. We conclude that the abilities that make
up empathy are potentially related to IA in a variety of conflicting ways, such that
a direct association between IA and various components of empathy has yet to be
established.
Keywords: empathy, perspective-taking, emotion recognition, interoception, heartbeat perception
Introduction
Empathy is an essential aspect of human emotional experience and social interaction (Panksepp,
1998; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013). It is, however, a notoriously
diﬃcult concept to deﬁne and operationalise (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Decety and Cowell, 2014).
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We adopt in this paper a deﬁnition of empathy as an umbrella
term comprising ‘aﬀect sharing,’ otherwise known as ‘Emotion
Contagion’ [which can lead to ‘personal distress (PD)’], ‘empathic
concern (EC)’ (deﬁned as the motivation to care for others) and
‘perspective-taking (PT),’ which is putting oneself in the other’s
emotional shoes (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Decety and Cowell,
2014).
Of these three components, aﬀect sharing is assumed to be
an automatic process, whereby perceiving or imagining another
person in a particular emotional state activates the same state in
the observer, producing similar autonomic and somatic responses
(Preston andHofelich, 2012), such that the emphasiser ‘feels with’
the person in distress (Singer and Lamm, 2009).
‘Empathic concern,’ which is also called ‘sympathy’ or
‘compassion,’ involves ‘feeling for’ the other person (Singer and
Lamm, 2009) and is associated with motivation to alleviate their
suﬀering (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Decety and Cowell, 2014).
This construct is frequently equated with empathy, although it
does not necessarily involve any aﬀect sharing (Bernhardt and
Singer, 2012).
During ‘PT’ the observer consciously puts herself in the shoes
of the person observed (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007).
This is closely related to theory of mind – the distinction being
that during the PT involved in empathy the observer must under-
stand the feelings of another person, whereas theory of mind is
deﬁned as understanding the other’s beliefs (Lawrence et al., 2004;
Preston and Hofelich, 2012).
All three components of empathy involve a process whereby
the empathiser represents both ‘self ’ and ‘other’ (the person
observed). This process may be regarded as a continuum.
Overlapping representations of self and other are involved
in aﬀect sharing. By contrast, accurate self/other distinction
(between one’s own and the other’s viewpoint) is required for
PT (Bird et al., 2010). It is unclear how self/other overlap or
self/other distinction impacts on EC. On the one hand EC
may be a function of previous aﬀect sharing and therefore
involve self/other overlap. However, it might equally depend
on good self/other distinction if, for example, aﬀect sharing
leads to PD which may interfere with the motivation to help
(Singer and Klimecki, 2013).
A link between empathy and ‘interoceptive awareness (IA)’
can be predicted, on the basis of both aﬀect sharing and
self/other distinction (or overlap), where IA is deﬁned as the
extent to which internal bodily cues reach awareness and inﬂu-
ence behavior, feelings and cognition. An extensive literature
shows that IA inﬂuences the intensity of an individual’s own
emotional experience (Barrett et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2005;
Wiens, 2005). For example, people with high IA report more
emotional arousal for identical changes in objective physiolog-
ical indices (Wiens, 2005; Pollatos and Schandry, 2008; Dunn
et al., 2010). This implies that high trait IA could be associ-
ated with greater aﬀect sharing, because the shared emotion
is potentially more intense than it would be in an individ-
ual with low IA. Moreover, self/other distinction (or overlap),
which is also crucial to empathy, is modulated by IA, speciﬁ-
cally in embodied contexts. Individuals with good IA are less
susceptible to body ownership illusions (Tsakiris et al., 2011;
Tajadura-Jiménez and Tsakiris, 2013) and when interoceptive
cues are projected onto a virtual image of their own body, or
hand, people have a greater sense of self-identiﬁcation with,
and self-location toward, that image (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki
et al., 2013). This suggests that IA is associated with better
self/other distinction and will therefore correlate positively with
PT, although a relationship with EC cannot be unambiguously
predicted.
The small number of studies that have attempted to link inte-
roception with empathy provide inconclusive evidence because
of diﬀerences in the way that both empathy and IA have been
operationalised and measured. For example, Fukushima et al.
(2011) reported that the amplitude of heartbeat-evoked poten-
tials (HEPs; a potential index of interoceptive cortical processing)
was higher when participants judged emotion in a pictured face,
compared with judgments of facial symmetry. Ernst et al. (2013)
found that when participants were asked to empathize with
emotional facial expressions after a period of explicit interocep-
tive attention, neural activity was enhanced in a number of brain
regions involved in interoception and self-processing, compared
with a control task of counting exteroceptive tones. These two
experiments, however, used indirect tests of both IA and empa-
thy. Other studies that compared the two traits using conven-
tional heartbeat perception measures of IA reported conﬂicting
results. Tajadura-Jiménez and Tsakiris (2013) reported correla-
tions between IA and both the PT and Fantasy (FS) subscales
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). Both
of these measures suggest better self/other distinction in people
with high IA but the relationships were signiﬁcant only at the
10% level (Tajadura-Jiménez and Tsakiris, 2013). More recently,
Grynberg and Pollatos (2015) found that participants with
good IA, who viewed pictures of people in painful situations,
rated the pain as greater and felt more compassion for the
suﬀerer, although they reported no greater PD than controls.
This result is potentially attributable to the greater emotional
arousal also reported by the participants with high IA, which
is typical of good heartbeat perceivers and could reﬂect aﬀect
sharing.
Given these conﬂicting results, we devised a set of experiments
in an attempt to elucidate various strands of the potential rela-
tionship between IA and the components of empathy, measuring
the former by the Mental Tracking Method of heartbeat percep-
tion (Schandry, 1981). Empathy has been assessed in many diﬀer-
ent ways. The measures chosen in the four studies described in
this paper were selected as widely usedmeasures of aﬀect sharing,
EC and PT and for being relevant to previous empirical research
purporting to show links between interoception and empathy.
We ﬁrst chose the most prominent self-report empathy scale,
which is the IRI (Davis, 1983). Its subscales include EC, PT
and PD, all of which refer to aspects of empathy that have
been described in theoretical accounts. The EC subscale of
the IRI has been particularly widely used as a general empa-
thy measure (for a review see Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
The IRI, however, possess no speciﬁc measure of aﬀect shar-
ing. We therefore selected as our second measure the recently
developed Questionnaire of Cognitive and Aﬀective Empathy
(QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011) which includes a subscale for
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‘Emotion Contagion’ (aﬀect sharing) and has the additional merit
of eﬀectively summarizing several common self-report empathy
measures.
Our third measure was also designed to assess aﬀect
sharing, reﬂecting the proposition that people understand
and interpret emotional facial expressions by automatically
simulating (i.e., by empathizing with) the observed expres-
sion (Preston and de Waal, 2002; Kaplan and Iacoboni,
2006). Although this ‘simulation account’ has been disputed
(Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011), it implies that people with
high IA, who experience their own emotions more strongly,
are likely to perform well when recognizing facial expres-
sions in the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). A further reason for choosing this measure
was that the two prominent studies, described above, that
report signiﬁcant relationships between empathy and intero-
ception have used similar facial stimuli (Fukushima et al.,
2011; Ernst et al., 2013). Furthermore, it has been reported
that people with high IA have an advantage in recognizing
the presence of emotion in faces, which might imply that
they are sharing aﬀect by mirroring the observed emotion
(Terasawa et al., 2014).
Finally, as a direct test of whether people with high IA are
better at separating self from other in domains other than multi-
sensory integration, we employed the ‘Director Task,’ which
measures cognitive PT ability (Santiesteban et al., 2012).
The four experiments were approved by the Ethics Committee
of the psychology department at Royal Holloway University of
London. All participants gave written informed consent and were
free to withdraw at will.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Ninety students at Royal Holloway University of London took
part for course credit. The data for four participants was excluded
because movement artifacts made it impossible to count the
number of recorded heartbeats. Of the remaining 86 (14 men),
mean age was 20.4 years (SD = 6.5).
Procedure
Participants completed the IRI after the heartbeat perception task.
Interoceptive Awareness (IA)
Interoceptive awareness wasmeasured using theMental Tracking
Method of heartbeat perception (Schandry, 1981). Heartbeat
perception methods correlate with awareness of gastric cues
(Whitehead and Drescher, 1980; Herbert et al., 2012). The
Mental Tracking Method has been extensively used in research
on emotion (Dunn et al., 2007; Herbert et al., 2010; Werner
et al., 2010; Pollatos et al., 2012). It is well-validated, with good
test–retest reliability and discriminates well between individ-
uals (Mussgay et al., 1999; Werner et al., 2013). Throughout
this paper ‘IA’ refers to the accuracy with which partici-
pants were able to count their own heartbeats on the Mental
Tracking task (Cuenen et al., 2012; Garﬁnkel and Critchley,
2013).
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair and given
several minutes to relax, in preparation for the task. All
instructions were delivered and behavioral responses were
recorded using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, USA) on a standard desktop PC. Instructions
were presented over noise-attenuating headphones. The onset
and oﬀset of each heartbeat counting trial were cued by
the words ‘go’ and ‘stop,’ presented audiovisually. Results are
sensitive to the instructions given (Ehlers et al., 1995) so
a standard instruction was used, whereby participants were
asked to concentrate hard and try to silently count their
own heartbeats, simply by ‘listening’ to their bodies, with-
out taking their pulse. Heartbeat signals were acquired with
a piezo-electric pulse transducer, ﬁtted to the participant’s
left index ﬁnger and connected to a physiological data unit
(26T PowerLab, AD Instruments), sampling at 1 kHz, which
recorded the derived electrical signal onto a second PC running
LabChart6 software (AD Instruments). Three trials (25, 35,
45 s) were presented in random order, after one training
interval of 15 s. No feedback was given. IA was calcu-
lated as [1/3 (1-(|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|
/recorded heartbeats); Schandry, 1981)]. Higher scores indi-
cate higher IA. Heart rate is known to correlate with IA and
this was also recorded during the heartbeat perception task
(Cameron, 2001; Knapp-Kline and Kline, 2005; Ainley et al.,
2012).
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The IRI (Davis, 1983) is a prominent, well-validated and reli-
able measure of trait empathy, containing four 7-item subscales.
These are EC, PT, PD, and Fantasy. Typical items are: for EC
‘I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate
than me’; for PT ‘I believe that there are two sides to every ques-
tion and try to look at them both’; for PD ‘When I see someone
who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces’; and for
Fantasy ‘I really get involved with the feelings of the characters
in a novel.’ Each item is scored on a ﬁve-point Likert scale
from 0 for ‘does not describe me well’ to 4 ‘describes me very
well.’
Results
The mean values and SD obtained were close to published norms
(Table 1).
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
and its subscales – empathic concern (EC), personal distress (PD),
perspective-taking (PT) and fantasy (FS).
IRI EC PD PT FS
Mean (SD) 65.8
(15.0)
19.9
(4.6)
11.7
(5.6)
17.2
(4.9)
16.8
(4.9)
Norms (a) 20.36
(4.02)
10.87
(4.78)
17.37
(4.79)
(a) Norms value provided by Davis as personal communication, reported in Belllini
et al. (2002).
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Correlations between IA and the IRI scores are shown in
Table 2. Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were
applied with an alpha value of 0.01. There were no signiﬁcant
correlations.
Mean IA was 0.64 (SD = 0.18). IA was negatively correlated
with the participants’ heart rate, r = −0.47, p < 0.001. Heart rate
was not signiﬁcantly correlated with any IRI measure.
In this sample there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mean IRI
scores between genders, F(1,84) = 11.7, p = 0.001. However,
the small number of men amongst the participants makes this
comparison unreliable. Correlations for the 72 women partici-
pants only were therefore also calculated. An apparent negative
correlation between IA and Fantasy did not survive Bonferroni
correction, with an alpha level of 0.01. No other correlation was
signiﬁcant.
Discussion of Experiment 1
We investigated the relationship between a standard measure of
IA and the most commonly used self-report measure of empa-
thy. There were no signiﬁcant correlations between IA and the
IRI as a whole or with any of its subscales. The only relation-
ship that approached signiﬁcance was a negative correlation with
Fantasy, suggesting that people with high IA tend not put them-
selves in the position of characters in books and ﬁlms, which
might perhaps reﬂect good self/other distinction. However, this
did not survive Bonferroni correction.
Although the IRI has the advantage of distinct, separable
subscales that refer to several theoretically based components
of empathy, direct mapping of each subscale onto a particular
aspect of empathy has been criticized (Singer and Lamm, 2009).
The EC score is a very widely used measure of empathy but did
not correlate with IA in this study. In order to verify the null
results found in Experiment 1, we selected a further self-report
measure – the QCAE (Reniers et al., 2011), which, unlike the IRI,
has a speciﬁc subscale designed to capture aﬀect sharing.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Thirty-four students (ﬁve men), mean age 20.2 years (SD = 2.9),
at Royal Holloway University of London, took part for payment.
There were no exclusions.
Procedure
Interoceptive awareness was measured as in Experiment 1.
Participants completed the QCAE after the heartbeat perception
task.
Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy
The QCAE (Reniers et al., 2011) is an attempt to capital-
ize on the strengths of several commonly used self-report
measures. It is comprised of items from the Empathy Quotient
(Lawrence et al., 2004), the Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969),
the Empathy subscale of the Impulsiveness-Venturesomeness-
Empathy Inventory (Esysenck and Eysenck, 1978), and the IRI
(Davis, 1983). The scale consists of 31 items to which participants
respond on a four-point Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree.’ ‘Cognitive Empathy’ is made up of two subscales
which are (i) ‘PT’ (deﬁned as ‘Intuitively putting oneself in
another person’s shoes’), assessed by 10 items, e.g., ‘I can easily
work out what another person might want to talk about’; and
(ii) ‘Online Simulation’ (deﬁned as ‘An eﬀortful attempt to put
oneself in another person’s position by imagining what that
person is feeling’), assessed by nine items, e.g., ‘I try to look
at everyone’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.’
By contrast, ‘Aﬀective Empathy’ is made up of three subscales,
which are (iii) ‘Emotion Contagion’ (deﬁned as ‘The automatic
mirroring of the feelings of others’), assessed by four items, e.g.,
‘People I am with have a strong inﬂuence on my mood’; (iv)
‘Proximal Responsivity’ (deﬁned as ‘Aﬀective responses when
witnessing the mood of others in a close social context’), assessed
by four items, e.g., ‘I am very unhappy when I see someone cry’;
and (v) Peripheral Responsivity (deﬁned as ‘Similar to Proximal
Responsivity but in a detached context’), assessed by four items,
e.g., ‘I usually stay detached when watching a ﬁlm.’
Results
The mean values for the QCAE scales were close to published
norms (Table 3).
Correlations between IA and the QCAE scores are shown in
Table 4 for all participants and for the 29 women participants
alone. IA was not signiﬁcantly correlated with the whole QCAE
scale nor with any of the subscale measures.
Mean IA was 0.61 (SD = 0.16). IA was negatively correlated
with average resting heart rate, for all participants, r = −0.37,
p = 0.03, and for the women participants alone, r = −0.45,
p = 0.02, as in Experiment 1. Correlations between heart rate
and scores on the QCAE and its subscales were non-signiﬁcant
(Bonferroni corrections with an alpha value of 0.006 were
applied).
Discussion of Experiment 2
No links were found between IA and any scale of the QCAE.
In particular, Emotion Contagion (which measure aﬀect shar-
ing) was not related to IA. The results of Experiment 2 thus
conﬁrm those of Experiment 1 and might be explained by
the general weakness of self-report measures. Questionnaires
TABLE 2 | Correlations between interoceptive awareness (IA), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and its subscales.
IRI EC PD PT FS
Correlations with IA (all participants) (n = 86) r = −0.10, p = 0.36 r = 0.002, p = 0.98 r = −0.12, p = 0.28 r = 0.10, p = 0.34 r = −0.23, p = 0.03∗
Correlations with IA (women only) (n = 72) r = −0.14, p = 0.23 r = 0.04, p = 0.75 r = −0.08, p = 0.50 r = 0.05, p = 0.66 r = −0.27, p = 0.02∗
∗non-significant after Bonferroni correction.
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics for the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCEA) and its subscales – cognitive empathy (Cog Emp)
perspective-taking (PT), online simulation (Sim), affective empathy (Affect Emp), emotion contagion (Emot Con), proximal responsivity (Prox Res) and
peripheral responsivity (Periph Res).
QCAE Cog Emp Affect Emp
PT Sim Emot Con Prox Res Periph Res
Women Mean (SD) 95.6 (7.5) 59.6 (5.4) 31.9 (3.2) 27.7 (3.0) 35.9 (4.7) 11.9 (2.0) 12.5 (2.0) 11.6 (2.8)
Men Mean (SD) 84.6 (7.6) 55.4 (6.1) 28.8 (4.1) 26.6 (2.4) 29.2 (4.7) 9.0 (3.3) 10.2 (2.4) 10.0 (1.0)
Norms for Women (a) 59.4 (6.3) 36.7 (4.3)
Norms for Men (a) 56.1 (10.5) 32.3 (6.3)
(a) Reported by Reniers et al. (2011) for University students, aged 20–30, n = 925.
TABLE 4 | Correlations between interoceptive awareness (IA) and the Questionnaire of Affective and Cognitive Empathy (QCAE) and its subscales.
QCAE Cog Emp Affect Emp
PT Sim Emot Con Prox Resp Periph Resp
Correl. with IA
n = 34
r = 0.09
p = 0.63
r = 0.07
p = 0.70
r = 0.18
p = 0.32
r = −0.08
p = 0.69
r = 0.06
p = 0.73
r = 0.13
p = 0.47
r = 0.01
p = 0.98
r < 0.01
p = 0.99
Correl. with IA
(women)
n = 29
r = −0.02
p = 0.91
r = −0.05
p = 0.79
r = 0.09
p = 0.64
r = −0.19
p = 0.32
r = 0.02
p = 0.91
r = 0.16
p = 0.42
r = −0.01
p = 0.96
r = −0.07
p = 0.73
can only reﬂect what people think they feel, rather than what
they would truly feel in any given context. Such measures are
open to the additional confound that they may index what
is socially desirable, rather than recording the respondent’s
true feelings (Singer and Lamm, 2009). The two further tests
we used require judgments that avoid these two confounds.
Given that several of the studies that have linked empathy
and interoception have used tasks involving the appraisal of
facial expressions which, it has been argued, involves aﬀect
sharing (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011), we next investigated
whether scores on the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test are
modulated by IA.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirteen adult members of the public volun-
teered to participate in this study, as part of the Live Science
installation at the Science Museum London. Sixteen partici-
pants were excluded before data analysis, due to incomplete data,
movement artifacts or insuﬃcient attention to the tasks, which
left 97 participants (40 men) in the ﬁnal data set. The mean age of
these participants was 31.0 years (SD = 12.0).
Procedure
Interoceptive awareness was measured as in Experiment 1.
Participants completed the Reading theMind in the Eyes test after
the heartbeat perception task.
‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Task
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task is a commonly used test
that is the product of research into empathy deﬁcits in autism.
The procedure was developed by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).
Participants are seated at a standard PC and shown a series of
36 images of faces cropped around the eyes. For each image,
participants are provided with four single words to describe the
possible emotions that the eyes could be displaying (e.g., serious,
ashamed, alarmed, or bewildered). They are required to choose
which description best matches the emotion displayed in the
image. The experiment is self-paced and takes about 7 min.
Results
Interoceptive awareness was calculated as in Experiment 1. The
mean IA score of this sample was 0.67 (SD = 0.17). As often
reported, average heart rate was signiﬁcantly negatively corre-
lated with IA, r = −0.43, p < 0.001.
Performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task was
assessed by calculating a simple accuracy score that indicated the
proportion of the total trials in which the participant identiﬁed
the correct emotion. Mean accuracy score was 0.74 (SD = 0.09).
There were no gender diﬀerences in accuracy, t(95) = −0.36,
p = 0.72. To identify links between IA and emotion recogni-
tion, a Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient was calculated between
IA scores and Reading the Mind in the Eyes scores but this was
non-signiﬁcant, r = −0.10, p = 0.36.
Discussion of Experiment 3
Although evidence suggests that individuals with high IA experi-
ence their own emotions as more intense than those with lower
IA (Wiens et al., 2000), our ﬁndings replicate those of Hanford
and colleagues who reported that this does not confer any bene-
ﬁts when people are required to recognize others’ emotions in
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Handford et al., 2013).
Their experiment, however, used a heartbeat discrimination task
based on the Method of Constant Stimuli in which the majority
of people score at chance (Lenggenhager et al., 2013; Eshkevari
et al., 2014). We had expected that IA measured by the Mental
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Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) might be a more success-
ful index because this test produces a distribution of scores
that is approximately Gaussian (Ainley et al., 2012). Terasawa’s
task, using full faces and morphs containing variable amounts of
emotion, also implies that there is a link between IA and recog-
nition of emotion in faces but their results were signiﬁcant only
when comparing the performance of the 10 best and 10 worst
heartbeat perceivers (Terasawa et al., 2014).
If the simulation account is correct in claiming that the
identiﬁcation of emotion in another person’s face relies on
resonating with the observed emotion (Gallese, 2007; Gallese
and Sinigaglia, 2011), then the ﬁndings of this experiment
casts doubt on the hypothesis that interoception is linked
to empathy. Alternatively the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
test itself may be performed by theory of mind and there-
fore not involve the observer resonating with the observed
emotion.
For our fourth and ﬁnal experiment we tested IA against
the ‘Director Task,’ which assesses cognitive PT (which requires
self/other distinction). Research into bodily illusions has
suggested that individuals with high IA may more clearly distin-
guish between their own and other’s perspectives in multisensory
contexts (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Aspell et al., 2013). We wished to
determine whether this advantage would translate to the Director
Task, given that putting oneself in another’s emotional shoes is a
facet of empathy.
Experiment 4
Method
Participants
Sixty-six adults volunteered for this study, as part of the Live
Science installation at the Science Museum, London. Six partici-
pants were excluded before data analysis due to incomplete data
and movement artifacts, which left 60 participants (34 men),
mean age 30.8 years (SD = 13.3).
Procedure
Interoceptive awareness was measured as in Experiment 1.
Participants completed the Director Task after the heartbeat
perception task.
The ‘Director Task’
The Director Task requires participants to move objects on
a computer screen according to verbal instructions from a
‘Director,’ delivered via headphones. Crucially, on critical trials
the Director’s visual perspective on the objects that have to be
moved diﬀers from that of participant. Thus participants must
understand the Director’s point of view in order to perform the
task correctly.
The visual stimulus consisted of a 4 × 4 grid containing eight
common objects. The image of a character, introduced as ‘the
Director,’ appears behind the grid. On each trial, the Director
would name one of the objects and instruct the participant to
move it, using the computer mouse, either one space up, down,
left, or right. Importantly, ﬁve of the spaces in the grid were
occluded, so that the participant could see the objects situated
in these spaces but the Director, who was standing behind the
grid, could not. In experimental trials (‘E’ trials), there was a
conﬂict between the participant’s and the Director’s perspective.
An example of such a situation would be if the Director asked
the participant to ‘move the small candle right,’ but the small-
est candle that the participant could see was occluded from the
Director. In this case, the participant should instead move the
second smallest candle, which can be seen by the Director. In
addition to these critical ‘E’ trials, there were also two types
of control trial (‘C1’ and ‘C2’ trials). In these trials there was
no conﬂict between the participant’s and Director’s perspectives.
Thus participants were either asked to move an object which was
the only item of that type and was visible to both participant and
Director (C1 trials); or the participant was asked to move the
smallest or largest of a type of object and again that target object
was visible to both (C2 trials).
The procedure and stimuli were adapted from Santiesteban
et al. (2012). For the participants in the current study, the task
was shortened in make it more suitable for members the general
public visiting the Science Museum. Participants completed 12
E trials, six C1 trials, and six C2 trials in total. The task took
about 5min. Participants’ accuracy and reaction times (RTs) were
recorded.
Results
Accuracy and RT data were analyzed with a repeated-measures
ANOVA with trial type (E vs. C1 vs. C2) as the within-subjects
factor. The data violated the sphericity assumption and there-
fore all results reported are with Greenhouse-Geisser correc-
tions. For accuracy scores, there was a main eﬀect of trial type,
F(1.31,77.47) = 28.72, p < 0.001. Post hoc paired samples t-
tests revealed that participants were signiﬁcantly more accurate
on C1 trials, M = 0.91, SD = 0.22, than they were on C2
trials, M = 0.61, SD = 0.17, t(59) = 12.19, p < 0.001, or
on E trials, M = 0.61, SD = 0.44, t(59) = 5.39, p < 0.001.
Performance did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between C2 and E trials,
t(59) = 0.02, p = 0.98. The same analysis was repeated with
gender inserted as a between-groups factor. The main eﬀect of
trial type remained, and there was no eﬀect of gender or any
interaction.
For RT scores, there was also a main eﬀect of trial type,
F(1.31,95.76) = 40.03, p < 0.001. Paired samples t-tests revealed
that responses on E trials, M = 4.54 s, SD = 1.20, were signif-
icantly slower than on both C1 trials, M = 3.79 s, SD = 1.04,
t(59) = 7.30, p < 0.001, and on C2 trials, M = 3.75 s,
SD = 0.88, t(59) = 6.74, p < 0.001. Performance on C1 and
C2 trials did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, t(59) = 0.38, p = 0.70.
The same analysis was repeated with gender inserted as a
between-groups factor. The main eﬀect of trial type remained,
and there was no main eﬀect of gender or any signiﬁcant
interaction.
Interoceptive awareness was calculated as in Experiment 1.
Mean IA was 0.71 (SD = 0.16). IA was negatively correlated with
the participants’ heart rate, r = −0.33, p < 0.001. Heart rate was
not signiﬁcantly correlated with any aspect of performance on the
Director Task.
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To assess the relationship between performance on the
Director Task and participants’ IA, we calculated Pearson’s corre-
lation coeﬃcients between participants’ performance on the E
trials and their IA scores. We focussed on E trials, as it is only
on these trials that the participant is required to take a perspec-
tive that conﬂicts with their own, which is the ability relevant to
cognitive empathy.
No signiﬁcant correlations were found between IA and perfor-
mance on E trials, either as measured by RTs, r = −0.02, p= 0.91,
or by accuracy, r = −0.08, p = 0.55. There was also no corre-
lation between IA and performance on C1 or C2 trials (all
p-values >0.47).
Discussion of Experiment 4
Research into body ownership illusions has implied that people
with high IA make better self/other distinctions in embodied
contexts (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al.,
2013). Given that the ability to distinguish between one’s own and
another’s perspective is crucial for successful performance on the
Director Task (Santiesteban et al., 2012), we hypothesized that we
would ﬁnd a positive association between IA and performance on
this task.
However, this association was not found. It is likely that the
type of sensory and embodied self/other distinction modulated
in bodily illusions does not carry over to the cognitive self/other
distinction measured by the Director Task, which may be solved
using theory of mind.
General Discussion
We investigated the relationship between individual diﬀerences
in IA and components of empathy, using a well-validated heart-
beat perception task, together with four measures. In our ﬁrst
study we found no signiﬁcant relationship with the IRI or any
of its subscales, including EC and PT. In a further group of
participants, no links were found between IA and scores on the
QCAE or its subscales, including Emotion Contagion (which
measures aﬀect sharing) and PT. A further study found no signif-
icant relationship between IA and judgment of facial emotion
in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001), which potentially depends on aﬀect sharing, as a result of
mirroring the observed emotion (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). In
our ﬁnal experiment, scores on the Director Task which assesses
cognitive PT (Santiesteban et al., 2012) were not associated with
IA. Our only signiﬁcant relationships were negative correlations
between heart rate and IA, as frequently reported in other stud-
ies (Cameron, 2001; Knapp-Kline and Kline, 2005; Fairclough
and Goodwin, 2007; Stevens et al., 2011), which potentially
reﬂect physiological variables such as stroke volume of the
heart.
These null ﬁndings imply that a simple relationship between
IA and any of the three components of empathy cannot be
predicted. The theoretical basis for supposed links rest on
evidence that IA is related to the intensity of one’s own emotional
experience. If empathy is embodied and involves the vicarious
experience of emotion, then it was predicted that people with
high IA would have a greater tendency to resonate with the
emotion that they observe in others. They should hence demon-
strate greater aﬀect sharing and hence higher scores on the
Emotion Contagion subscale of the QCAE as well as better abil-
ity in identifying emotional expressions in the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes test, assuming that the task involves shared aﬀect by
mirroring of the observed emotion.
However, a previously overlooked issue, which may explain
our results, is that it is by no means obvious how the better
self/other distinction that is associated with high IA impacts on
the components of empathy. If high IA is accompanied by less
self/other overlap, this might involve less shared aﬀect and conse-
quently less experience of vicarious emotion. Thus if the eﬀects of
greater emotional arousal and greater self/other distinction work
in opposite directions, as seems probable, then the predicted link
between IA and aﬀect sharing becomes a matter of which eﬀect is
stronger. We believe that this type of complexity explains our null
results for the Emotion Contagion subscale of the QCAE and the
Reading theMind in the Eyes test. Support for his idea is provided
by Grynberg and Pollatos’ (2015) study in which good heartbeat
perceivers reported more compassion when viewing pictures of
people in pain. Their results suggest that the higher arousal these
participants also reported led them to judge the observed pain as
more severe. However, they did not report greater PD, which may
have been the result of good self/other distinction which allowed
these individuals to avoid sharing the suﬀering. In support of
this we found no relationship between IA and the PD subscale
of the IRI.
Empathic concern (the motivation to help others) was not
linked to IA in either questionnaire. EC is commonly used as
a general measure of empathy. However, a link between the
two would be anticipated only if EC is inﬂuenced by previous
experience of aﬀect sharing or, alternatively, by better self/other
distinction (both of which are potentially greater in good heart-
beat perceivers). Potentially, EC relies, at least in part, on
theory of mind rather than direct aﬀect sharing (Bernhardt and
Singer, 2012), which would negate any obvious direct relationship
with IA.
With regard to PT, we expected a relationship between IA and
the aﬀective PT subscales of the two questionnaires (which assess
putting oneself in another’s emotional shoes), given that people
with high IA make better self/other distinction on embodied
contexts. That no relationship was found suggests that the type of
PT measured by putting oneself in the other person’s emotional
shoes may depend on theory of mind, rather than on an embod-
ied response. By contrast, the Director Task is a good measure of
cognitive PT (Decety and Cowell, 2014) but the test may also be
solved by theory of mind (Santiesteban et al., 2014), in which case
it too is not necessarily comparable with the type of embodied
self/other distinction that is involved in body ownership.
The diﬀerence between the results presented here and experi-
ments that have previously reported links between empathy and
IA can be attributed to diﬀerences of deﬁnition and measure-
ment. In Ernst et al.’s (2013) study, for example, a heartbeat-
counting task primed emotion circuits in the insula such that
the eﬀects carry over into a subsequent emotion appraisal task.
This signiﬁcant ﬁnding shows that attention to interoception
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enhances subsequent emotion processing. However, the authors
did not assess IA as generally deﬁned (Garﬁnkel and Critchley,
2013) and did not establish whether IA, as a trait, is linked
to empathy. A similar diﬃculty of deﬁnition arises with
Fukushima et al.’s (2011) study, which likewise employed an
emotional appraisal task. The amplitude of HEPs increased
during this empathy manipulation. However, while the ampli-
tude of the HEP is a useful index of interoceptive processing,
it has not previously been taken as a measure of trait IA.
Fukushima et al.’s (2011) experiment therefore also provides,
at best, indirect evidence of a possible link between IA and
empathy.
In addition to the criticism of our four measures that are
addressed above, further limitations of our study are that we did
not screen for personality variables, such as psychopathy, narcis-
sism, altruism, agreeableness, or trait anxiety, which potentially
moderate links between IA and empathy.
Our results support the characterisation of empathy as an
umbrella term for a distributed set of mechanisms (Singer,
2006; Decety, 2010; Zahavi, 2012). Foremost of these is aﬀect
sharing, which may be linked to IA through greater intensity
of emotional experience, although good self/other distinction
potentially confounds the relationship. An important focus for
future research is further direct tests of aﬀect sharing, such as
empathy for pain (Singer et al., 2004) and facial EMG (Lamm
et al., 2008). EC, by contrast, is perhaps a product of aﬀect
sharing, self/other distinction and theory of mind, so that a
clear relationship with IA cannot be predicted. Finally, PT is
closely related to theory of mind and may not be inﬂuenced
by the type of embodied self/other distinction that is modu-
lated by IA in body ownership illusions. While it is therefore
probable that people with high IA have the ability to use their
bodies to simulate the emotions of other people, we conclude
that they may do so only in certain contexts, so that reli-
able associations between empathy measures and IA cannot be
predicted.
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